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I. INTRODUCTION
A broad range of consensual sexual practices are prohibited or regulated

through criminal law. I am referring to laws relating to homosexual sex,
teenage sex, intergenerational sex, commercial sex, public sex, sadomasochistic
sex, and adult incest. The applicability of the term "consensual" is contested
in many of these contexts-in feminist debates about prostitution, for
example. But for my purposes here, I take consent at face value and use the
term "consensual" to indicate any sexual practice or interaction to which all
the participants consider themselves to have consented.
Let me begin by offering a snapshot of the state of criminal law with
regard to consensual sex in the United States. 1
Sodomy laws render consensual and private anal and oral sex between
same-sex partners criminal in half the states. A number of states also maintain
criminal prohibitions against consensual heterosexual sodomy, although such
prohibitions are rarely enforced. Sodomy laws have been challenged on grounds
of privacy, vagueness, and equality; privacy challenges have occasionally
2
succeeded at the state level.
Prostitution is illegal throughout the United States, except in a few
counties of Nevada where it is permitted only in a licensed "house of
prostitution".

2

Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. The author wishes to thank Nathaniel Berman
and Duncan Kennedy for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. She also wishes
to thank Alice Jardine for introducing her to Julia Kristeva's work on abjection.
For a survey of the relevant legislation from which much of the following discussion is drawn,
see R.A. Posner & K.B. Silbaugh, A Guide to America's Sex Laws (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1996).
Privacy and equality challenges to sodomy laws have failed under the Federal Constitution
(Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) [hereinafter Bowers]), but have occasionally succeeded
under state constitutions (Commonwealth v. Wasson, 1992 WL 235-412 (Ky. September 24,
1992); Commonwealth v. Balthazar,318 N.E. 2d 478 (Mass. 1974)).
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Laws against public sex-that is, solicitation, vagrancy, and loitering
statutes-may also be used to prosecute anyone identified by authorities as a
prostitute. 3 These public sex laws are also used to criminalize public expression
of homosexuality. 4 It bears noting here that the definition of "public" in this
context is not confined to public streets and parks: it extends to cars, movie
theaters, and members-only clubs. 5 It may even extend to an individual's
home if more than two people are present. 6 Vagueness challenges have
occasionally been successful against this constellation of laws, but privacy
7
and freedom of expression challenges have never succeeded.
Public nudity is criminalized in almost every state as "indecency".
Freedom of expression challenges have occasionally succeeded when nude
8
dancing has been at issue.
Adult consensual incest is a felony in every state.
Sadomasochistic sex has been prosecuted as criminal assault a number of
times. A consent defence, parallel to that which operates in cases involving
violent sports, has never been allowed in this context. 9
Fornication, adultery, and cohabitation statutes that criminalize
unmarried and extramarital sex remain on the books in many states. Although
these statutes are seldom enforced, legislators sometimes face fierce opposition
when they undertake to repeal them. 10
Age of consent statutes, more commonly known as statutory rape laws,
criminalize intergenerational sex in every state. The party under the age of
consent is deemed incapable of consent regardless of any protestation to the
contrary on his or, more often, her part. Those swept up in this net include,
for example, an 18-year-old Wisconsin man who had intercourse with

3

4

5
6
7
8
9
10

Vagueness challenges to such statutes have occasionally succeeded, but privacy and freedom
of expression challenges have consistently failed (United States v. Moses, 339 A. 2d 46 (D.C. Cir.
1975)).
Freedom of expression challenges have failed in this context on the basis that solicitation to
engage in homosexual sex constitutes "fighting" words (Ohio v. Phipps, 389 N.E. 2d 1128
(Ohio Sup. Ct. 1979) [hereinafter Phipps]).
P. Califia, Public Sex: The Culture of Radical Sex (Pittsburgh: Cleis Press, 1994) at 71.
Lovisi v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
See e.g. Phipps, supra note 4; People v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984); People v. Superior Court
(Caswell), 758 P. 2d. 1046 (Cal. 1988).
See e.g. Miller v. Civil City of South-bend, 904 F. 2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Miller].
See e.g. People v. Samuels, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); New Jersey v. Brown, 364 A. 2d
27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976); Iowa v. Collier, 372 N.W. 2d 303 (Iowa App. 1985).
For five years in a row, Massachusetts legislators have tried and failed to lift the state's criminal
sanctions against fornication, adultery, and cohabitation after divorce. See A. Walker,
"Lawmakers Again Tackle a Repeal of Old Sex Law" (11 June 1997) Boston Globe, Bi. The
Massachusetts adultery law was upheld as constitutional as recently as 1983 on the basis that
the damage that adultery does to the marital relationship justifies criminal sanction
(Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E. 2d 357 (Mass. 1983)).
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his 15-year-old consenting fiancee. 11 In some states, the "victim" of an
intergenerational affair may also be convicted as an aider and abetter of the
offence. Or, he or she may be subject to sanctions as a juvenile delinquent
under state law. 12 In a number of states, consensual sex between youths of
similar age is also illegal. 13 Even in states where this is not the case, other laws
may be used to criminalize such sexual interaction. In 1997, a 14-year-old
Kentucky boy was convicted of kidnapping for persuading his 12-year-old
girlfriend to sneak out of her parents' house for a late-night rendezvous with
him. 14 And in Idaho, an enterprising prosecutor recently revived the offence
of fornication in order to bring teenage mothers under the control of the
criminal justice system. 15
The above makes clear that the application of criminal law to consensual
sex is an arena of conflict and contest between conservative and liberal
forces in the United States, with occasional feminist interventions. The same
arguments tend to recur on each side of the debate. Conservatives assert
the appropriateness and necessity of enforcing a particular Judeo-Christian
sexual morality through law. Liberals argue for tolerance of private consensual
sexual conduct. When the debate shifts from the private to the public arena,
conservatives may argue privacy principles, asserting the right of bystanders
to be let alone, whereas liberals may shift to freedom of expression arguments.
In most cases, conservatives prevail.
I have not undertaken a systematic survey of such laws in Canada, but
the same dynamic appears to be at work here, with conservatives and liberals
fighting on the same terrain, albeit with more liberal victories in the realm of
private consensual conduct. For example, private and consensual anal sex
was decriminalized in Canada in 1969, but the definition of private is very
restrictive (only two people present) and there remains a differential age of
consent (18 as opposed to 14).16
In this paper, I am seeking to find a new way of understanding the
criminal regulation of consensual sex that transcends this conservative-liberal

11
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State v. Gillson, 222 Wis. 2d 218 (1997).
See e.g. Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148 (1985); In Re Frederick 622 N.E. 2d 762 (Ohio Com.
P1. 1993).
See e.g. in Arizona, where a 16-year-old boy was convicted of sexual abuse for touching the

14
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breasts of a 14-year-old girl with her consent (Matterof Pima County Juvenile Appeal No. 74802-2,
790 P. 2d 723 (Ariz. 1990)).
Interview with a Kentucky public defender, December 1997.
M. Hanson, "Miscarriage of Justice? An Idaho Prosecutor Charges Pregnant, Unmarried Teens

16

and Their Adult Boyfriends with Sex Crimes" (November 1996) 82 A.B.A. J.26.
G. Kinsman, The Regulation of Desire: Homo and Hetero Sexualities, rev. 2d ed. (Montreal: Black
Rose Books, 1996) at 277.
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debate. I do so by turning to an element that threads through both sides of
the debate, though it is deployed to very different effect. That element is
abjection.
In tracking the debate through courts, legislatures, and academic literature,
I noted that regardless of who was arguing, or which side was winning in any
particular context, the discussion was peppered with references to disgust or
revulsion. These were not incidental, throw-away references. An examination
of the theory behind the opposing arguments reveals that disgust plays a
central role in determining for each camp which consensual sexual practices
should or should not be regulated through criminal law.
Disgust is deployed by conservatives to argue for prohibition of various
consensual sexual practices. On the other side, one might expect liberals to
keep their disgust under wraps in the interest of pluralistic tolerance. This
proves not to be the case. Liberals do argue that the generation of disgust by
any given practice is not a sufficient basis for criminalizing consensual
conduct, but nevertheless frequently invoke disgust to justify confining such
conduct to the private realm.
Drawing upon literary and psychoanalytic theory, the above references
can be characterized as abjection responses and linked to anxiety about the
maintenance of boundaries. I am speaking here of boundaries between a
variety of cherished classifications, such as human/animal, male/female,
adult/child, and citizen/foreigner, the existence of which impose a semblance
of order and hierarchy in society. Making this link helps to explain why many
are so strongly invested in regulating the private and consensual conduct of
others.
II. ABJECTION
I take the term "abjection" from psychoanalytic theory, in particular from
Julia Kristeva's work. 17 The abject is alien, taboo, unclean. It provokes
abjection-a rejection, a casting out, the creation of a barrier between the
subject and the abject.
Let me illustrate by attempting a phenomenology of abjection, an
exploration of emotional and physical responses to the abject. I begin
with Kristeva's discussion of food loathing, "the most elementary and most
archaic form of abjection." 18 She speaks of the visceral bodily response one
has to the skin on sour milk. One feels disgust and consequent nausea at the
sight or touch of this skin. This sense of disgust or repulsion, this feeling of

17
18

Powers of Horror:An Essay on Abjection, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
Ibid. at 2.
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nausea, signals the presence of the abject. In order to be rid of it, one
retches, one vomits.
Jean-Paul Sartre's discussion of sliminess in Being and Nothingness provides
another example of the abject. 19 According to Sartre, slime is disturbing because
it is an aberrant fluid. It is neither liquid nor solid. When one touches it, it
sticks: "It is a soft yielding action, a moist and feminine sucking, it lives
obscurely under my fingers and I sense it like a dizziness; it draws me to it as
the bottom of a precipice might draw me." 20 Sliminess provokes fear because
on touching it, one fears one might be lost in it. Unlike water, which simply
slides off the body, slime does not let go.
A flip side of disgust that might also be characterized as an abjection
response is sexual arousal. Disgust and desire may be closely connected. This
connection has been unwittingly made by a number of American judges in
grappling with the question of whether the operative obscenity test"appealing to the prurient interest"-requires that the material at issue be
sexually arousing to the average member of the community. If so, what
happens to pornography that, according to the court, repulses the average
member of the community-for example, gay porn or pornography involving
bestiality? Must the jury try to imagine what would be sexually arousing for
the average gay man or the average practitioner of bestiality in order to
determine if such material is obscene, or does it escape the law altogether?
Ultimately, this line of cases determined that the repulsive as well as the
arousing appeals to "the prurient interest." 21 Thus, some state codes define
the prurient interest as including "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
22
sex or excretion."
Drawing on the above, abjection, while clearly tied to emotion, is
experienced very viscerally, perhaps in a more "embodied" way than many
other emotions. Indeed, it might be mistaken for an involuntary physical
response. A catalogue of abjection responses would include disgust, revulsion,
nausea, horror, fear, and anxiety. Such responses may manifest physically in
a gag reflex or in sexual arousal.
According to psychoanalytic theory, the power of abjection derives from
its connection to early experiences of separation and the attainment of
subjectivity. I will focus here on two stages in childhood development that

19

Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, trans. H.E. Barnes (New York:

20
21
22

Philosophical Library, 1956).
Ibid. at 609.
See e.g. Ripplinger v. Collins 868 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1989).
Ibid. at 1053.
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have preoccupied psychoanalytic theorists from Freud to Kristeva and beyond.
The first is the anal stage, when the child begins to experience a distinction
between the inside and the outside of its body, connected with the expulsion
of feces. This is the "first material separation that is controllable by the
human being." 23 As such, defecation is a source of pleasure. Ultimately
however, the mother regulates the oral and anal drives of the child, overseeing
what goes into and comes out of the child's body. These are the child's first
lessons of social regulation. It learns that feces are dirty and not to be
touched. Defecation becomes a source of shame.
The second stage of particular interest for my purposes is the child's
initial psychic separation from the mother. Kristeva speaks of the child's need
to abject the mother's body in order to separate from her. At this early stage,
the child is not yet a subject and the mother is not yet an object. The child
experiences itself and its mother as one, rather than as two distinct entities.
Abjection divides the child and the mother into subject and object, self and
other. It is a necessary precursor to the child's entry into the symbolic order
and the consequent attainment of language and subjectivity.24 Note the
importance here of the sexed position that the child must take up in the
symbolic order, and the different consequences, depending on whether the
child is male or female, of abjecting the mother's body, the female body.

23
24

Kristeva, supra note 17 at 108.
To those familiar with the work of Jacques Lacan, this will be recognizable as a reworking of
his version of the Oedipal crisis that propels the child from the imaginary into the symbolic
order, into subjectivity, signification, and submission to the "law of the father". In Lacanian
theory, at this stage, the father splits up the dyadic unity between mother and child, and
forbids the child's further access to the mother's body. The phallus here represents the law of
the father (the threat of castration), signifying separation and loss to the child-the loss of the
mother's body. The "primary repression" occurs: the repression of desire for the mother's body
and for imaginary unity with her. The primary repression opens up the child's unconscious.
This entry into the symbolic order is linked with the acquisition of language. A child learning
to say "I am" is admitting that it has given up imaginary identity with the mother/the other
and thereby taken up its allotted place in the symbolic order. The speaking subject comes into
existence as a result of repression of the desire for the mother. From this point, the child's
desire moves from object to object, or from signifier to signifier, never finding full satisfaction
as it can never attain ultimate desire (lost imaginary harmony with mother and the world).
See E. Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1990); J. Mitchell &
J. Rose, eds., FeminineSexuality: JacquesLacan and the 6cole freudienne (New York: W.W. Norton,
1982).
For those who prefer Freudian psychoanalysis, the rough parallel is with Sigmund
Freud's original articulation of the Oedipal complex and its ultimate dissolution, that is, the
renunciation of the mother as a love object in response to fear of castration and the consequent
submission to the authority of the father. In this version, the child thereafter internalizes the
father's authority in the form of the superego as a facet of the unconscious. See S. Freud,
"Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" (1905); "Some Psychical Consequences of the
Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes" (1925); "Femininity" (1931) in E. Young-Bruehl,
ed., Freud on Women: A Reader (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990) at 89, 304, 342.
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Until now, I have spoken of abjection in visceral terms. The child's
initial psychic separation from the mother occurs at a very young age, at
which point abjection is not experienced this way. Clearly, the young child
does not regard its mother's body as repulsive. If we revisit this scene in
adolescence, however, when the child is reenacting the process of separation
and asserting independence, I think we can speak of a visceral abjection as
well as a psychic one. Suddenly, the mother's body or, at least, the idea of the
mother as a sexual being, of the parents having sex, is repulsive. The child
gags.
Abjection is thus linked to anxiety about boundaries: boundaries
between the inside and the outside of the body maintained through, yet
threatened by, the ingestion of food and the expulsion of feces; boundaries
between self and other, first between mother and child, then subsequently
between male and female; and, on a collective level, boundaries between one
community and another, between citizen and foreigner. One needs an
"abject" to define oneself against. Abjection is necessary; it is constitutive of
selves and of communities, even as it threatens the destruction of both.
Abjection responses are invoked in service of boundary maintenance-to
maintain wholeness and purity.
Ultimately, Kristeva asserts:
[A]bjection is coextensive with social and symbolic order, on the
individual as well as on the collective level. By virtue of this,
abjection, just like prohibitionof incest, is a universal phenomenon;
one encounters it as soon as the symbolic and/or social dimension
of man is constituted, and this throughout the course of civilization.
But abjection assumes specific shapes and different codings
25
according to the various 'symbolic systems'.
In a 1966 anthropological study, from which Kristeva draws extensively,
Mary Douglas articulates some of these shapes and codings through
exploration of rituals and religious practices that serve to delineate and
exclude the abject in various cultures. 26 In some of the cultures which
Douglas studies, bodily boundaries are closely policed through food taboos;
for example, strict avoidance of readmitting to the body anything that
has issued therefrom. The body here is clearly a symbol for society as a
whole-" [i]ts boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened

25
26

Supra note 17 at 68 [emphasis in original].
Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: Routledge, 1966).
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or precarious." 2 7 In other cultures, taboos on male contact with menstrual
blood are observed. Menstrual blood is regarded as a pollutant that threatens
social divisions between the sexes.
Douglas asserts that "ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and
punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an
inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference
between within and without, above and below, male and female, with and
28
against, that a semblance of order is created."
I contend that the establishment and enforcement of criminal laws that
prohibit consensual sexual conduct function similarly. The creation of a class
of deviants through law operates to strengthen the conventional morality of
the group. It provides something for the community to define itself against.
Law provides a formal point of contact between "normal" and "deviant"; it
offers a tangible boundary. I am borrowing from Emile Durkheim here in
suggesting that law and deviance perform this function, 29 but hopefully with
a more critical spin. That is, I do not simply accept community morality as a
given which is then expressed through law-power has to be taken into
account. Laws operate as tangible boundaries to keep out the abject, but at
the same time, create categories of the abject by the classifications thereby
privileged. And abjection, the visceral emotional and physical response, is
invoked over and over again in the legal arena to maintain those boundaries
and those categories.
III. CONSERVATISM AND ABJECTION

In 1957, the Wolfenden Committee released a report to the British
Parliament recommending the decriminalization of private homosexual
practices between consenting adults. The Committee explicitly situated its
recommendations within a liberal framework, declaring at the outset that "it
is not the function of the law to intervene in the private lives of its citizens,
or to seek the enforcement of any particular pattern of behaviour." 30
Lord Devlin disagreed in a 1959 lecture that responded to the Wolfenden
Report. 3 1 In the published version of the lecture, he asserts that criminal
27
28
29

Ibid. at 116.
Ibid. at 4.
The Division of Labour in Society, trans. George Simpson (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960).

30

See also K. Erikson, Wayward Puritans:A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1966).
Great Britain, Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, The Wolfenden Report:

31

Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (New York: Stein and Day,
1963) at 13.
"Morals and the Criminal Law" in The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University
Press, 1965).
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law has always concerned itself with morality and that it is its proper role to
continue to do so. Law does not simply exist for the protection of individuals;
crimes are crimes because they offend society, so there is no reason why
consent of the victim should ever be determinative. He defines immorality as
"what every right-minded person is presumed to consider to be immoral." 32
He goes further, however, to say that it is not enough for the majority simply
to dislike a practice; there must be "disgust" which "is deeply felt and not
manufactured"-"a real feeling of reprobation." 33 In his view, this requirement
protects the fragile balance between the rights of the individual and the
interests of society.
Lord Devlin concedes that the source of this reprobation, and therefore
much of the criminal law, is Christian morality. He does not, however, suggest
that the religious credentials of any given prohibition justify its codification
in the criminal law. He does not say that that which is condemned in the
Bible, or by any particular church, can properly be criminalized. His test is
that which provokes "deeply felt disgust" or "a real feeling of reprobation".
The reach of this test is not coextensive with religious condemnation; it is
simultaneously narrower and wider than this. It is narrower in that religious
condemnation cannot ground a criminal prohibition unless that condemnation
is combined with "deeply felt disgust". Yet it is wider, in that a practice that
is not condemned by any religious tenet may be criminalized on the grounds
that it nonetheless provokes "deeply felt disgust".
Lord Devlin's test appears to be grounded in abjection. That which is
experienced as abject by a majority of the population may properly be cast
out of society through the mechanism of the criminal law.
Lord Devlin asserts that societies are constituted through "shared ideas
on politics, morals and ethics"-common agreements as to "what is good
and what is evil". 34 If this agreement falls apart, society disintegrates. He
concludes that if "a recognized morality is as necessary to society as, say, a
recognized government, then society may use the law to preserve morality in
the same way as it uses it to safeguard anything else that is essential to
its existence." 3 5 In this context, Lord Devlin likens moral transgression to
treason-each endangers the very existence of society and thus "the suppression
of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subversive
36
activities."

32

Ibid. at 15.

33
34
35
36

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

at
at
at
at

17.
10.
11.
13-14.
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Lord Devlin invokes abjection to justify laws that maintain boundaries
and counter social disintegration. For him, law ideally serves the same
function as many of the rituals Douglas describes in her anthropological
study. Criminal law here operates to demarcate the limits of tolerance, and
police those limits. Symbolically and in actuality, law bolsters the moral
structure of society.
Turning back to American sex law, does a survey of cases bear out this
analysis? Certainly, references to abjection responses are plentiful among a
range of lawmakers and enforcers. The same year that the Wolfenden Report
was released, a Ninth Circuit appellate judge deemed the magazine of a gay
organization to be obscene and therefore unmailable on the ground that a
poem published therein depicting gay male sexual activity "pertains to sexual
matters of such a vulgar and indecent nature that it tends to arouse a feeling
37
of disgust and repulsion."
In 1973, Justice Fogelman of the Arkansas Supreme Court began a
judgment upholding the constitutionality of a sodomy statute as follows: "it
will be unnecessary for us to set out the sordid testimony about the act,
which appeared so revolting to one of the two deputies sheriff, who stated
they observed it while patroling the area, that he vomited thrice during
the evening." 38 The act in question turned out to be one man performing
fellatio on another in an automobile parked in a rest area adjacent to a
highway.
In 1986, Senator Jesse Helms voiced his objection to safe sex materials
which described "satisfying erotic alternatives to high risk sexual practices"
for gay men, saying: "There is no mention of any moral code ...Good Lord,
Mr. President, I may throw up." 39 Senator Helms was subsequently successful
in introducing an amendment which forbade publicly funded AIDS education
materials from advocating homosexuality. 40
Thus we have a judge, a policeman, and a senator each disgusted to
the point of illness by acts of consensual sex. Does the language of abjection
here indicate an underlying anxiety about boundaries in line with the
psychoanalytic and existential theory discussed above? Is abjection invoked
to justify the maintenance of those boundaries through law? Before addressing
these questions, I will turn, for a moment, to a consideration of the role of
abjection in liberal theory.
37

One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 at 777 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd 355 U.S. 371 (9th Cir. 1958).

38

Carterv. State of Arkansas 500 S.W.2d 368 at 370 (Sup. Ct. Arkansas 1973).

39

Cited in N. Hunter, "Censorship and Identity in the Age of AIDS" in M.P. Levine et al., eds.,
In Changing Times: Gay Men and Lesbians EncounterHIV/AIDS (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1997) 39 at 46.
Ibid. at 45-46.

40
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IV. LIBERALISM AND ABJECTION

Until now, it may have seemed as if conservatives have a monopoly on
abjection. What about the liberals in the debate? They may claim to eschew
boundaries in the name of pluralistic tolerance, but they too draw boundaries,
most notably between public and private conduct. Most of the liberal victories
with respect to decriminalizing consensual sexual practices have relied on
privacy arguments. In the context of decriminalizing homosexual sodomy
while maintaining prohibitions against public homosexual expression, Larry
Cata Backer notes that tolerance of private conduct is a small price to pay to
keep what liberals regard as disgusting conduct out of their view, out of the
public view. 4 1 A boundary is being drawn and fortified around the perimeters
of the closet. The closet becomes a prison rather than a refuge of gay men and
lesbians.
In this connection, it must be noted that in cases where judges advocate
the liberal solution of decriminalization of private consensual conduct, they
often feel compelled nonetheless to register their own disgust and disapproval.
For example, in the House of Lords decision in R. v. Brown that upheld the
convictions for criminal assault of a number of participants in sadomasochistic
sex, Lord Mustill prefaced his dissenting opinion as follows:
Fortunately for the reader my Lords have not gone on to describe
other aspects of the appellants behaviour of a similar but more
extreme kind which was not the subject of any charge on the
indictment. It is sufficient to say that whatever the outsider might
feel about the subject matter of the prosecutions-perhaps horror,
amazement or incomprehension, perhaps sadness-very few
could read even a summary of the other activities without disgust.
The house has been spared the videotapes which must have been
42
horrible.
Disgust is invoked to justify a legal boundary between public and privatenot the same boundary as conservatives wish to erect and maintain, but a
boundary nonetheless.
A sophisticated analysis of the appropriate role for disgust in liberal
theories of criminal regulation can be found in the work of Joel Fainberg. He
devotes the second volume of his four-part series on The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law to a consideration of when it is appropriate to criminalize
41
42

"Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization of Private Sexual Conduct, the
Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration" (1993) 45 Fla. L. Rev. 755.
[1993] 2 All E.R. 75 at 101.
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conduct that causes "Offence to Others". 43 He states that most liberals would
like to stop at John Stuart Mill's harm principle, but reluctantly concede that,
to some extent, conduct that does not harm but offends others is also
sometimes properly curbed by criminal law.
Fainberg attempts to develop "mediating principles" to determine which
sorts of offensive conduct ought to be so curbed. Ultimately, he adopts a
"public nuisance" approach that weighs the seriousness of the offence
against the reasonableness of the offender's conduct.
This still constitutes an exercise in line drawing, though liberals may
thereby draw the line in a different place than conservatives. Justice Posner
provides an example of this kind of liberal line drawing in his judgment in
Miller:
The harm done to public order by a performance of Salome in
which Salome ends the Dance of the Seven veils clad only in a
transparent body stocking and therefore nude under Indiana lawas in a performance last fall at the Lyric Opera in Chicago-is not
of the same order of magnitude as the harm (in fright, disgust or
embarassment), slight as it may be, caused by a person who runs
down the middle of a busy street stark naked or urinates in an
alley. Only in the latter cases does the concept of public decency
44
supply a persuasive rationale for punishment.
In striking down Indiana's ban on nude dancing as a violation of freedom of
expression rights, Justice Posner rejects the line conservatives have drawn
between obscene and non-obscene nude dancing that could distinguish a
performance of Salome from the bump and grind of the Kitty Kat lounge.
However, he goes on to draw a distinction between nude dancing and public
urination or streaking.
There is another liberal abjection to consider-the liberal abjection of
their conservative rivals. In his recent book, The Anatomy of Disgust, William
Miller notes a species of disgust generated by the overly fastidious, "because
the fastidious call attention to the disgusting by being so zealous to avoid
it.... The fastidious person calls attention to himself with regard to just those
facets of life which decorum requires that we must publicly pretend do not
exist." 45 There is something of this at work in the disgust that liberals express
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for conservatives' sensitivity to disgust. For example, in the case discussed
above, Justice Posner says of the conservative faction who wish to prohibit
nude dancing in Indiana: "Many of us do not admire busybodies who want
to bring the force of the law down on the heads of adults whose harmless
46
private pleasures the busybodies find revolting."
V. POLICING THE BOUNDARIES

Andrea Dworkin has said of obscenity law that the operative test appears
to be that whatever gives the judge an erection qualifies as obscene. 47 With
respect to the legal regulation of consensual sex, might it now be said that
whatever makes the judge or the legislator throw up can rightfully be
criminalized? Are the above isolated incidents of U.S. lawmakers utilizing
the language of abjection or are they indications of a logic of abjection
underlying U.S. sex law?
As noted earlier, abjection is linked to the drawing and patrolling of
boundaries-bodily

boundaries, boundaries within communities, and

boundaries between communities. The following exploration of the way in
which criminal law, historically and presently, has established and policed
such boundaries in the arena of consensual sex suggests that there is indeed
a preoccupation with boundaries underlying the language of abjection
discussed above.
A. BODILY BOUNDARIES: THE INVIOLABLE MALE BODY

As previously stated, sodomy laws criminalize anal and oral sex between
consenting adult same-sex partners in half the states. This prohibition
sometimes applies to heterosexual partners as well. In Bowers, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that sodomy laws which target homosexual sex do not violate
constitutional privacy and equality guarantees. What was at work there?
Certainly Judeo-Christian moral tenets were invoked. In an opinion
concurring with the majority, Chief Justice Burger states of homosexual sex:
"Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian moral
and ethical standards.... To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is
somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia
of moral teaching." 48 Justice White, delivering the majority opinion, does
not make such a naked appeal to religious morality, but asserts that there
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can be no fundamental right to consensual homosexual sodomy because
"proscriptions against sodomy have very ancient roots."' 49
Is this an example of the straightforward use of criminal law to enforce
religious, specifically Christian, morality? In other cases, indeed in other
privacy cases, the full weight of the criminal law was not thought necessary
to protect the edifice of Christian morality. Access to birth control and
abortion were held to be protected by privacy doctrine, 50 despite religious
prohibitions. Individual rights were in those contexts thought to outweigh
religious morality; if the use of birth control and the performance of abortions
are sins, sanctions are left to religious, not legal, authority.
Indeed, the ancient proscriptions to which Justice White refers were no
less violated by access to birth control and abortion. Anne Goldstein has
tracked the roots of sodomy laws back to colonial New England and found
that they were not originally aimed at punishing homosexual sexual practices.51
They were part of a constellation of laws aimed at punishing any nonprocreative sexual activity. If these ancient proscriptions could be relaxed to
allow access to birth control and abortion, why not to allow consensual
homosexual sex? What independent threat could consensual homosexual
sex pose?
Criminal prohibitions of sodomy might be characterized as a ritual
policing of bodily boundaries calculated to protect the symbolic figure of the
inviolable male body. In a book titled Intercourse, Andrea Dworkin grounds
female subordination in women's penetrability: "in being fucked, [woman] is
possessed: ceases to exist as a discrete individual: is taken over."5 2 Possession
achieved through sexual penetration exiles woman from the human
condition-she is left with no sovereignty, no self. 53 In Dworkin's view,
sodomy laws serve to protect men from this fate: "The sodomy laws are
important, perhaps essential, in maintaining for men a superiority of civil
and sexual status over women. They protect men as a class from the violation
of penetration; men's bodies have unbreachable boundaries." 54
Certainly, in practice, sodomy laws do not serve to protect the male body
from penetration. First, they are not solely directed at the activities of men.
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55
Although frequently absent from legal discourse on the question, lesbians
are also prosecuted under sodomy statutes. 56 Second, such laws do not protect

homosexual male bodies from violation; on the contrary, they provide for
57
state and state-sanctioned harassment and terrorization of gay men.
But returning to Douglas, ritual is about symbolization, not about
achieving practical results. If penetrability is antithetical to maleness and
therefore to subjecthood, maintaining a prohibition against penetration of
the bodily orifices which men and women have in common-the mouth and
the anus-may well serve as a symbolic safeguard of individual subjectivity.
Further, if the male body represents not just the self, but society more
broadly, sodomy laws may also serve as a symbolic safeguard of national
security.58 Remember the connection Lord Devlin made between moral
transgression and treason. I will return to this point later when I take up the
question of boundaries between communities.
B. BOUNDARIES WITHIN COMMUNITIES: THE STRANGER WITHIN

Douglas theorizes pollution behavior as "the reaction which condemns any
59
object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications." She
illustrates her point through a reconsideration of the dietary rules articulated
in Leviticus. She concludes that each of the forbidden species in some way
defies conventional classification-for example, sea creatures that do not
swim, or winged creatures that do not fly. This defiance of classification
threatens order and therefore denotes a lack of purity, of holiness: "By rules
of avoidance holiness was given a physical expression in every encounter
60
with the animal kingdom and at every meal."
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Carefully bounded classifications of male and female operate to maintain
social hierarchy in the United States, as elsewhere. A legal expression of the
importance accorded to purity in these classifications can be found in the
laws against cross-dressing that proliferated across the country in the form
of city ordinances throughout the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries. These ordinances prohibited anyone from appearing in public "in
61
a dress not belonging to his or her sex".
While these ordinances likely originated in response to the first wave of
the women's movement-the spectre of women in trousers signifying
women's movement claims to greater freedom and participation in societyultimately, they were most often used to harass butch lesbians and gay female
impersonators. 62 State "disguise" laws were put to similar purpose.
Prosecutions under cross-dressing laws continued into the 1970s; the first
cross-dressing ordinance to be enacted, in St. Louis in 1864, was the last to
be removed from the books when it was ruled unconstitutionally vague in
1986.63
Despite the demise of cross-dressing ordinances, law continues to bolster
the power of other societal institutions to police the gender divide in a similar
fashion. In Harper v. Edgewood Board of Education, Judge Rubin held that
Edgewood school had not violated the rights of two teenagers in having
them forcibly removed from their Junior-Senior prom by a police officer after
they arrived "dressed in the clothing of members of the opposite sex." 64 The
school board's gender specific dress regulations were deemed by the court
to be "reasonably related to the valid educational purposes of teaching
community values and maintaining school discipline." 65
The case of Doe v. Boeing6 6 provides a workplace parallel. The plaintiff, an
employee of Boeing Company, was a male-to-female transsexual. She was
forbidden to wear "feminine" clothing to work until after reassignment.
Boeing considered clothing to be "feminine" if it would likely cause complaint
if worn in a men's restroom. A blouse, earrings, lipstick, and nylon stockings
passed this test, but a strand of pearls did not. Boeing deemed the necklace
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"excessively feminine" and fired the employee. The Court held that Boeing
Company had not discriminated against the plaintiff.
The enforcement of public sex laws to suppress public expression of
homosexuality yields another example of the will to police the boundaries
between male and female. An invitation to participate in sexual conduct
made by a man to a woman or by a woman to a man only qualifies as
solicitation under public sex laws if money is involved. An invitation to
participate in same-sex intimacy is deemed solicitation regardless. Expressions
of same-sex intimacy falling far short of the conduct criminalized under
sodomy statutes-for example, kissing-may well be prosecuted as "lewd" or
"indecent" under public sex laws. Same-sex dancing in gay bars has lead to
"disorderly conduct" charges under liquor licensing provisions. 67 Further,
even if not prosecuted, such expressions make individuals vulnerable to
68
surveillance and potential subsequent arrest under sodomy statutes.
The justifications for this network of regulation of homosexual expression
are various. For example, in Phipps, Justice Locher held that the state has ample
reason to suppress homosexual propositions in the interest of achieving a
workable degree of social organization and harmony as such propositions
have proven likely to provoke a violent response. 69 General appeals to
public decency and morality are also common in this context. It is not
simply the sexual nature of the conduct that offends public order; if that
were the case, a similar range of heterosexual expression would be prohibited
as well. Rather, the public expression of homosexual desire disrupts the allimportant classification of people into the categories of male and female in
a society in which heterosexual orientation is regarded as a definitive
characteristic of gender.
This brings us back to sodomy statutes. John Stoltenberg suggests that in
this culture, male biology is not sufficient to constitute maleness; one must
also act like a man and part of acting like a man is "having" a woman. A man
must "have sex" to have gender. 70 Dworkin provides the other half of this
picture. Intercourse-that is, being penetrated-is what defines woman and
also what keeps her in her place: "Intercourse is supposed to be natural and
in it a man and a woman are supposed to show and do what each is by
nature."
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Thus laws that confine permissible sex to male penetration of women
(coupled with laws which make it difficult for women to resist penetration)
have a central role in creating and maintaining the social order. They ensure
that men become men and women become women, and that the boundaries
between the sexes are transgressed only literally, on heterosexual male terms:
Law steps in where nature fails: virtually everywhere. Laws create
nature-a male nature and a female nature and natural intercourseby telling errant, unnatural human beings what to do and what
not to do to protect and express their real nature-the real male,
the real female, the real hierarchy that nature or God created
72
putting man on top.
C. BOUNDARIES BETWEEN COMMUNITIES: THE STRANGER WITHOUT
Noelle McAfee asserts:
By applying the notion of abjection to the formation of nationstates, we can explain the fascination and horror a nation-state
develops toward foreigners. A nation-state constitutes its own
boundaries by excluding what is other. But insofar as the other
(someone who constitutes/threatens identity) resides within the
nation-state, the foreign object becomes the foreign abject. The
73
foreigner must be abjected, if not physically, then psychically.
Both these processes operate in the United States vis-a-vis those sexualities
and sexual practices deemed "other". In the U.S., national boundaries have
been constructed to exclude sexual others by, for example, drafting or
interpreting immigration laws to deny homosexuals and prostitutes entry
into the country, whether on the basis of criminal conviction, psychiatric
label, or a vaguely defined standard of "good moral character". At the same
time, deportation laws have been similarly construed to expel non-citizens
74
who have engaged in these practices.
Exclusion of homosexuals from citizenship on psychiatric grounds
ended in 1990 when the policy behind it was revoked in an amendment to
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the Immigration Act.7 5 To some extent, however, a new health-based exclusion
had already superseded it. In 1987, Senator Helms sponsored a directive
adding AIDS-and subsequently "HIV disease"-to the list of infectious
diseases which precludes non-citizens from entering the United States.
William Eskridge and Nan Hunter suggest: "To the extent HIV infection is
associated with gay and bisexual men, the HIV infection exclusion becomes
76
a partial replacement for the gay exclusion."
The sexual "other" residing within the country has also been, in McAfee's
terms, abjected psychically, if not physically. In 1950, "homosexuals and
other sex perverts" were deemed by the U.S. Congress "to be an enemy of the
state because of their threat to American youth, public morals, and national
security." 77 Thus, throughout the Cold War, gay men and lesbians were
purged from the civil service, fired from teaching jobs, and expelled from
schools. Surveillance of gay men and lesbians was, of course, stepped up, so
that those to be fired and expelled could be identified. The FBI joined local
law enforcement agencies in this quest. I shift in focus here from criminal
prosecution for homosexual conduct to civil sanction for homosexual conduct
or status. But the importance of the criminalization of homosexual conduct
to the witch hunts and purges of the McCarthy years cannot be overstated. 78
The legal infrastructure was already in place through which the effort could
be undertaken and subsequently legitimated. Eskridge states that, during the
1950s:
Homosexual panic.. .paralleled Communist panic, and the two
intermixed, during which charges of homosexuality were confused
with or even dominated charges of political subversion.... Even
more than conquest by an external enemy, the American nightmare
was conquest from within-a nation of pod people (homosexuals)
79
who had taken over the bodies of real people (heterosexuals).
This brings Lord Devlin's parallel between moral transgression and
treason vividly to life. Homosexual men and lesbians were clearly viewed
as a moral danger in this context-homosexuality was analogized to a
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pollutant, a contagious disease. 80 But politicians took the crusade further
than this. They were not simply worried about moral decay (disintegration
from within) but with national security (dangers from without): "Already
believed to be morally enfeebled by sexual indulgence, homosexuals would
readily succumb to the blandishments of the spy and betray their country
'8 1
rather than risk exposure of their sexual identity.'
Here we are not talking about the actual foreigner, or the stranger without,
but rather about the conflation in social and legal consciousness of the stranger
without and the stranger within. Eskridge asserts: "Many anti-homosexual
Americans, including closeted homosexuals, viewed the closet as a Trojan
Horse whose secluded occupants were a fifth column threatening to destroy
82
the United States, morally and politically."
To some degree, the same analysis holds today in connection with the
expulsion of gay men and lesbians from the military and the denial of
security clearances to gay men and lesbians to work in federal agencies such
as the FBI. For example, Retired General Norman Schwarzkopf grounded his
opposition to lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military on the need for
"unit cohesion" and the disastrous consequences of a failure of that cohesion
in the face of battle. 83 Once again, the homosexual man is cast as the abject
whose return threatens disintegration. The FBI's exclusionary policy was
upheld as recently as 1987 on the basis that homosexuals and bisexuals are
potential security risks. 84 Once again, the stranger without and the stranger
within are conflated.
VI. LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

If the foregoing analysis is correct, what are its legal and political implications?
Does grounding the law in abjection, articulated as necessary to and a universal
feature of both the individual psyche and the collective consciousness that
establishes communities, require acceptance of the boundaries that have
been drawn, of the uses to which abjection has been put?
I think not. First, while abjection has been theorized as necessary and
universal, the forms it takes, the "specific shapes and different codings" that
it assumes, are culturally specific and therefore open to transformation.
Harlon Dalton points out: "Little of what disgusts us is absolute, rooted in
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human nature, or divinely ordained. Rather, our sensibilities are, in general,
culturally contingent and surprisingly plastic." 85 Further:
[I]t
is worth underscoring that our sensibilities change. Some
changes are relatively small. I have nearly gotten to the point
where I can eat everything at my local sushi bar without gagging.
But the big stuff changes as well-how we approach sex and
sexuality, race, gender, God, country, our bodies, our planet-and
that is true for societies as well as for individuals, over periods
86
briefer than a human lifetime.
Second, the link between abjection and law does not simply run one
way. Thus far, I have emphasized the way the law mirrors and enforces the
abject as already psychologically or socially conceived. But the law does not
simply reflect social norms; it is also constitutive of them. Recall that for Lord
Devlin, the limits of tolerance, at which point law may rightfully intervene,
were marked by disgust that was "deeply felt and not manufactured". In fact,
even deeply felt disgust is manufactured and law may play a role in its
manufacture. Clearly then, law is an important site from which to reconceive
the abject.
Finally, even if we accept abjection as necessary and universal, we need
not accept its codification in law, especially in criminal law. On this point,
Dalton concludes: "That which prompts us to register disgust is uncertain,
arbitrary, and changeable. As such, it is poor soil in which to root the criminal
law."

87

Having identified the link between abjection and law, we can work to
dismantle it in particular contexts. Douglas points out that it is precisely at
the points where collective endorsement of a boundary, of an abject category,
breaks down, that ritual comes into play to bolster the existing social structure.
Pollution rules may be invoked to marshal "moral disapproval when it
lags." 88 Arenas of legal struggle intersect with arenas of social struggle. Legal
boundaries may serve to cement social boundaries. Alternatively, shifting
social boundaries may shift legal boundaries and shifting legal boundaries
may shift social boundaries. Thus, even accepting the necessity of abjection,
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law can be embraced as a site of transformation, a place from which the
boundaries of abjection may be shifted, the abject reconceived.
VII. STRATEGIES FOR RECONCEIVING THE ABJECT
A. SHIFTING THE BOUNDARIES
In a recent article, Chai Feldblum revisited Lord Devlin with an eye toward
creating a new paradigm through which to challenge discrimination based
on sexual orientation. 89 She argues that traditional liberal strategies have been
short-sighted in failing to engage directly on the issue of the morality of
homosexuality with conservative opposition. 9 0 She is willing to accept Lord
Devlin's premise that "the state may legislate on the basis of a community's
positive conventional morality", but argues that even now conventional
morality can embrace same-sex intimacy as a positive good. 91 She maintains
that even if this is not yet the case, only direct argument on moral grounds
will afford the "opportunity to change society's moral view of homosexuality."92
Feldblum speaks of the "substantive moral goods" embodied in gay
relationships in the following terms:
For many gay people, these relationships replicate the institution
society has come to denote and value as marriage. It means a
relationship that is 'for better or for worse, in sickness and in
health.' It means a relationship in which each person is primary
for the other; in which one partner paces the floor if and when
the other is in surgery; in which two people nurse each other when
they are sick and celebrate with each other when good fortune
strikes. And for many gay people, this relationship means raising
children of choice in a family marked by love and commitment. 93
Feldblum asserts that many of those who now believe that homosexuality
is immoral may be expressing "disgust with the idea of promiscuous sex
or sex without love" which they "mistakenly identify as equivalent to
homosexual life." 94 They may be persuaded to the contrary if "an explicit
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educational endeavour is undertaken, designed to demonstrate the substantive
moral values manifested in thousands of same-sex couplings across the
country." 95 The boundaries of abjection would shift.
B. DOING AWAY WITH BOUNDARIES

Clearly, there are dangers in Feldblum's approach. Feldblum offers a boundary
shift wherein monogamous same-sex partners whose relationships resemble
heterosexual marriages are welcomed in, but those who enjoy promiscuous
sex or sex without love remain on the outside. Shifting the boundaries does
not do away with the boundaries. There is always an inside and an outside
with the abject howling at the margins.
Gayle Rubin warns against redrawing boundaries in ways that fragment
marginalized communities, turning members against one another. She points
to the political strategies of some gay rights activists who have sought
inclusion and respectability at the cost of jettisoning practitioners of other
marginalized sexualities from the gay community-in particular, those who
96
practice sadomasochism or engage in intergenerational affairs. She would
do away with the boundaries, at least insofar as consensual sex is concerned.
Of course, Rubin is not doing away with boundaries altogether. She is placing
her boundaries, in the context of criminal law, between consensual and nonconsensual conduct-another sort of liberal boundary.
C. PLAYING BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE

We cannot get rid of abjection; we need to separate from others to become
selves. In psychoanalytic parlance, to refuse separation is to enter psychosis:
97
"Somehow we have to learn to live with and perhaps even use abjection."
We need to figure out how to maintain boundaries but play both sides of them,
to reconceive the relationship between subject and abject, to reconceive the
very nature of boundaries.
Judith Butler offers a place to begin. She reminds us that while the abject
is, by definition, on the outside, it is also "'inside' the subject as its own
founding repudiation." 98 She notes the erotic character of the abject:
"Sexuality is as much motivated by the fantasy of retrieving prohibited
objects as by the desire to remain protected from the threat of punishment
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that such a retrieval might bring on." 9 9 Remember that in order to attain
subject status, the child abjects the mother, its first love object, and thereafter,
desire is constituted in reference to that lost object. Thus, the possibility
exists of "a pleasurable insurrection against the law or an erotic turning of the
law against itself." 100
According to Butler, the realm of the abject can serve as a site for
resistance and as such, empowerment:
For an occupation or a reterritorialization of a term that has been
used to abject a population can become the site of resistance, the
possibility of an enabling social and political resignification. And
this has happened to a certain extent with the notion of 'queer.'
The contemporary redeployment enacts a prohibition and a
degradation against itself, spawning a different order of values, a
political affirmation from and through the very term which in a
prior usage had as its final aim the eradication of precisely such
an affirmation. 10 1
William Eskridge offers a parallel example of the subversion of legal
categories of abjection. He highlights the Foucauldian paradox that the legal
effort to suppress homosexual expression in the 1950s actually instigated
homosexual expression.
Suspected homosexuals were lured into conversations with state
actors, including decoy cops, army shrinks, military commanders
and investigators, the FBI, PHS doctors and INS agents, federal
civil service and security clearance officials, local and state boards
of education, state bar associations and other professional review
boards, censors, customs officials, and alcoholic beverage control
boards and their undercover agents. These conversations themselves
often intensified people's perception of their perverse sexual

feelings. 102
The same paradox operated on a collective scale: "Ironically, the American
anti-homosexual terror helped create a homosexual rights movement." 10 3

99
100
101
102
103

Ibid. at 100.
Ibid. at 110.
Ibid. at 231.
Supra note 62 at 753-54.
Ibid. at 770.

Criminal Regulation of Consensual Sex

143

This is not to say that enforcing conservative formulations of the abject
through criminal law is therefore a positive, but rather to suggest that this is
one of the ways that abjection can be used, one of the ways that law can be
turned against itself.
The key to maintaining the boundaries of abjection is that that which is
cast beyond them becomes unintelligible, unsymbolizable. If the boundaries
that divide subject from abject are reformulated, if they become more porous
and bridgeable such that the abject can return, speak, and be heard, change
may be wrought within the symbolic order itself. Abjection can be reworked
into political agency. 104
VIII. CONCLUSION
The invocation of disgust is an extraordinarily powerful rhetorical tool. A
description of misery may cause listeners to empathize, but will not likely
cause them to feel misery. A description of disgust however, may well provoke
listeners to experience disgust themselves. For this reason, disgust is difficult
to argue with. It appears to be an involuntary physical response and we tend
to take it at face value.
The foregoing analysis suggests that we ought not to do so. We have to
look behind disgust. I do not mean that we have to ask whether or not
individuals honestly feel the disgust they express in particular circumstances,
although we can ask that too. Rather, we have to figure out where disgust
stems from and what it means, in order to determine what political agenda
it serves in any given context.
In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Charles Darwin
described disgust as follows:
The term 'disgust,' in its simplest sense, means something offensive
to the taste. It is curious how readily this feeling is excited by
anything unusual in the appearance, odour, or nature of our
food. In Tierra del Fuego a native touched with his finger some
cold preserved meat which I was eating at our biovac, and plainly
showed utter disgust at its softness; while I felt utter disgust at my
food being touched by a naked savage, though his hands did not
appear dirty. 105

104
105

Butler, supra note 98 at 21.
Cited in Miller, supra note 45 at 1.
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It is likely that the disgust of both parties to this interaction was honestly felt,
but that does not mean it should go unquestioned. The cultural conditioning
that produced these responses must be analyzed. And, given the very different
positions of Darwin and the Tierra del Fuegan in a colonial context, the
potential consequences of their responses must be weighed. Each party may
abject the other, fortifying the cultural boundary that divides them. But if
that abjection takes a legal form, which party is likely to end up on the inside
and which on the outside of that boundary?
In relation to the criminal regulation of consensual sex in contemporary
American society, disgust is deployed to fortify boundaries that oppress
marginalized actors and communities. In this context, we cannot allow
expressions of disgust to prematurely shut down analyses. The discussion
must begin there, not end. If disgust is operating through law as a mechanism
to abject oppressed communities, we have to make that link and attempt its
transformation.

